Axiom One of the Raymond Method
- john raymond
- Jul 18
- 3 min read
Trust no one until they have proven themselves reliable—and always accept that betrayal is possible.
I. Strategic Function of Axiom One
This axiom is not a matter of tone or ideology. It is the epistemic baseline of asymmetric war analysis—a hard rule for evaluating power, deception, and conflict under modern conditions.
In a world of weaponized ignorance, camouflaged sabotage, false flags, and narrative warfare, the analyst must begin from distrust. Trust is earned by action, not claimed by affiliation.
Autocrats, corrupt elites, and hybrid actors rely on systems that still assume reliability. Axiom One closes that blind spot.
II. Why It’s Necessary
Asymmetric conflict is defined by the presence of hidden adversaries, perforated alliances, and weaponized ambiguity. False friends delay action. Compromised institutions bleed credibility. Allies under pressure collapse without warning.
Most analysts fail because they wrongly assume:
Governments speak honestly.
Bureaucracies act in good faith.
Officials are aligned with stated objectives.
Role is equal to behavior.
Axiom One reverses this default:
Assume compromise unless reliability is repeatedly and visibly demonstrated—especially under stress.
III. Scientific and Systems Foundation
This principle maps directly to:
Zero Trust Security Architecture (in computing): Assume no actor is trustworthy until authenticated and continuously verified.
Survivability Logic (in evolutionary systems): Organisms survive not by assuming cooperation, but by preparing for betrayal.
Applied to geopolitics, Axiom One acts as a firewall against infiltration—not just by cyberattack, but by narrative, institutional rot, feeble mindedness, and procedural delay.
IV. Behavioral Implications
The Raymond Method analyst must:
Track actions, not alliances.
Monitor cost-bearing decisions, not soundbites.
Treat inconsistency and delay as likely signs of disloyalty or sabotage.
All alliances become conditional. Loyalty is granted incrementally, not categorically. This builds resilience.
V. Case Applications
Trump: Demonstrated pattern of subversion, delay, and misdirection. Treated as a proven adversary. No rehabilitation without overwhelming reversal.
Rutte: Foolish. Unproven. Praise of Trump during structural sabotage of NATO shows misalignment with mission objectives. Cannot be trusted until his reliability is field-tested.
Musk: Strategic ambiguity, platform manipulation, and alignment with authoritarian narratives. Untrustworthy until wartime actions prove otherwise.
VI. What This Axiom Prevents
Strategic blindness: You never get caught unprepared by a betrayal you could have forecast.
Narrative miscapture: You don’t adopt stories from unreliable and compromised actors at face value.
Institutional fragility: You build alliances that are real, not rhetorical.
VII. Historical Scientific Basis: The Byzantine Generals Problem
The logic behind Axiom One is not just philosophical—it is computational.
The Byzantine Generals Problem is a foundational dilemma in distributed systems theory. It describes the challenge of achieving coordinated action in a network where some actors may be malicious or compromised, and their intentions cannot be known with certainty.
A group of generals must agree on a battle plan, but some are not just unreliable, some are traitors. Messages may be delayed, altered, or forged. The group must find a way to reach consensus despite the possibility of this betrayal from within.
This mirrors exactly the conditions of modern geopolitical alliances in asymmetric war:
NATO, the EU, and U.S. institutions are filled with actors—internal and external—who may act foolishly, delay, lie, or sabotage.
Coordination cannot be assumed. Consensus cannot be automatic.
Trust must be established by behavior, not by role.
Axiom One is the real-world application of the Byzantine problem’s insight:
You must design your reasoning to survive even when the system includes unreliable actors as well as actual traitors.
That is the core survival logic of the Raymond Method.
VIII. Conclusion: Strategic Clarity Begins With Conditional Distrust
Every subsequent step in the Raymond Method—adversarial modeling, real-world minimax, and the interpretation of ambiguous moves—only works if Axiom One is in place.
If you begin by trusting a liar, a saboteur, a coward, or a fool, no method in the world can save you. If you begin with structured distrust, then even betrayal becomes predictable.
In asymmetric war, betrayal is not a risk—it is a foundational constraint. Axiom One prepares you to see it coming. And everything that follows in the Raymond Method flows from this unflinching starting point.
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