Axiom Three of the Raymond Method: When Your Proven Enemy Makes a Move, Start From the Position That They Are Trying to Harm You, Beat You, or Destroy You
- john raymond
- Jul 19
- 3 min read
I. Strategic Function of Axiom Three
Axiom One tells you: Trust no one until they’ve proven themselves reliable.
Axiom Two tells you: When they’ve proven they’re your enemy, treat them accordingly.
Axiom Three answers the next question: What do you do when a known enemy makes a move?
You start from the assumption that they are trying to harm you—strategically, institutionally, or existentially.
In asymmetric warfare, enemy moves rarely declare themselves as harmful. They are camouflaged behind press statements, procedural justifications, or gestures of cooperation.
Axiom Three demands that you strip away appearances and read the move for what it is likely to become: a threat.
II. Why It’s Necessary
Modern adversaries thrive on ambiguity. They couch harmful intent in bureaucratic language, or stage actions as neutral, even helpful. These are:
“Delays” that allow battlefield losses.
“Budgetary constraints” that gut defense.
“Peace offers” that enable rearming.
“Dissent” that aligns with autocracy.
These actions are rarely called out because they hide behind democratic process or diplomatic complexity.
But when the actor behind them is already established as hostile (per Axiom Two), then their moves are no longer up for benefit-of-the-doubt interpretation.
Every action from a proven enemy must be assessed as if its goal is to destroy you—until proven otherwise.
III. Functional Impact of Axiom Three
Axiom Three is about threat modeling:
You begin by forecasting the maximum plausible harm.
You choose your responses based on that potential, not public relations spin.
You stop wasting time with “what ifs” and instead start preparing for “what’s next.”
It doesn't matter how reasonable the move looks. It matters what it could enable. And you plan as if it’s designed to enable the worst.
IV. Scientific and Strategic Grounding: Minimax Game Theory
Axiom Three is rooted in minimax, a core principle in adversarial game theory.
Minimax assumes:
The opponent will make the move that is maximally harmful to you.
Therefore, your best strategy is to act as if they are making their strongest play against you.
This is how Deep Blue beat Kasparov. This is how missile defense is built. This is how autocrats operate—relentlessly maximizing their advantage while you hesitate.
Minimax logic doesn’t assume goodwill. It assumes adversarial intent. The Raymond Method applies this directly to real-world geopolitics.
V. Real-World Examples of Axiom Three in Action
Trump’s conditional support for Ukraine aid: Pitched as negotiation. Actually a wedge to delay resupply, strain Ukrainian readiness, and weaken NATO's cohesion at a critical time.
Putin’s “peace offers” following territorial setbacks: Disguised as diplomacy. Function as pause-and-rearm tactics.
Musk throttling Starlink for Ukrainian forces: Cast as technical or policy compliance. Operationally a battlefield sabotage with strategic consequences.
In each case, Axiom Three dictates the correct response:
Assume these actions are designed to hurt you and your allies. Forecast the worst. Counter early—before the harm sets in.
VI. What This Axiom Prevents
Naïve optimism: No more hoping hostile actors have “turned a corner.”
Slow recognition of sabotage: You don't wait for visible damage to confirm strategic malice.
Analytical paralysis: You replace ambiguity with modeled threat and actionable forecasting.
VII. When Enemy Actions Lack a Harmful Endgame (Toward Axiom Four)
The application of Axiom Three will at times lead you into ambiguous end states. In that case you have to use Axiom Four.
Axiom Three only says: start by interpreting enemy moves as hostile when looking for their utility.
VIII. Conclusion: The Harm Is the Point
If your proven enemy moves a piece, the piece is probably meant to wound you. Not maybe. Not possibly. Probably.
You don’t wait for confirmation. You don’t seek bipartisan consensus on whether a saboteur is a saboteur. You start from the theory that harm is intended. Because when it is, and you’re late, it’s already too late.
This is the difference between fragile democracies and resilient ones. Between surprise and preparedness. Between playing and winning.
In asymmetric war, minimax is not optional. It is life support.
And Axiom Three is where the Raymond Method turns theory into survival.
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