Phase 0 As Option Value: What ISW Should Have Said—and Why Vexler Is Right
- john raymond
- Oct 10
- 3 min read
The only analytically coherent way to read “Phase 0” is as optionality: Russia is deliberately withholding actions that would foreclose escalation against NATO. That is not a doctrinal proof of war-preparation; it is a probabilistic statement about not doing disqualifying things.
Vlad Vexler is correct to condemn ISW’s intelligence-scented framing; the right public assessment is simple: given the pattern of hybrid attacks, force-posture adjustments, and airspace probes, Russia is preserving the escalatory option, and NATO should behave accordingly.
The Evidence
Since the September 9–11, 2025 drone incursions into Poland—followed by Poland’s Article 4 consultations and NATO’s launch of Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12—the operating environment has been a textbook gray-zone campaign: airspace violations, drone overflights of infrastructure, and coordinated disinformation.
This is precisely the behavior set compatible with keeping escalation on the table without triggering immediate conventional war. (Event dates: drones 9–11 September; Article 4 consultations mid-September; Eastern Sentry announced September 12 and reiterated September 23.)
The pattern has continued: reporting documents additional airspace violations and drone disruptions across the Baltics and Northern Europe; EU leadership publicly labeled the campaign “gray zone” this week and called for an EU anti-drone architecture. These are observable symptoms of coercive shaping—not proof of an imminent attack, but a refusal to preclude one. (Publish dates: October 8–9, 2025; the Polish incursion occurred September 10–11.)
On the force-generation side, Russia has re-established and restructured the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts and is expanding basing opposite Finland—again, steps that keep options open on NATO’s flank without committing to a timetable. These are slow-moving, verifiable posture changes that enable future pressure. (ISW assessed the restructuring through mid-2025; Finnish and independent reporting show new construction near the border.)
The Analysis
Vexler’s critique lands because ISW’s October 6 note slides from interpretation into “intelligence-speak.” The headline claim—“accelerating the informational and psychological condition-setting phase, Phase 0, for a possible NATO-Russia war”—is not backed by verifiable doctrine or proprietary access; it’s an interpretive gloss dressed in probabilistic diction.
The same report hedges that it has not observed indicators of imminent conflict, which is an implicit concession that the headline is about optionality, not a concrete countdown. That is precisely what Phase 0 should signify in public analysis: Russia is not taking steps that would close the escalatory branch. Name it plainly.
Under the Raymond Method’s Pillar One (Regime Security), this behavior is rational: hybrid activity corrodes Western governance and public trust while retaining escalation leverage. Pillar Two (Asymmetric Warfare) explains the method—swarms of drones, sabotage, GPS jamming, arson, and information ops that test alliance seams and normalize abnormality. NATO’s Eastern Sentry is therefore not overreaction but prudent risk-management to a counterparty maximizing option value.
What the ISW Should Have Written
“Given Russia’s pattern of gray-zone operations and force-posture adjustments, Moscow is intentionally preserving the option to escalate against NATO. We see no indicators of imminent conflict; we do see a deliberate refusal to take actions that would preclude it.
Allies should therefore harden air defenses, raise counter-drone readiness, and treat hybrid probes as calibrated tests of alliance response.” That is analytically honest, actionable, and consistent with observable facts and allied responses in September–October 2025.
The Implications
First, the ISW should stop laundering interpretation as doctrine. Public rigor matters because gray-zone coercion relies on epistemic corrosion. Vexler’s point is not cosmetic; it is strategic.
Second, take “Phase 0” to mean “optionality preserved.” That framing aligns the facts (incursions, disinformation, posture changes) with proportional countermeasures (persistent air policing, integrated counter-UAS, legal authorities to neutralize drones, and alliance-wide public-communication discipline).
Third, communicate with dates, not vibes: cite the 9–11 September incursion; the September 12 and 23 NATO communiqués; the October 8–9 EU statements. Precision denies the adversary the ambiguity it seeks.
The Only Real Conclusion
Vexler is right: bullshitting helps no one. And yet, the truthful and useful statement is still stark: Russia is structuring the battlespace so that escalation remains feasible at a time of its choosing.
NATO’s task is to collapse the option value—operationally (air and counter-drone readiness), institutionally (clear Article 4/5 signaling), and epistemically (analysis that distinguishes what is known from what is inferred).
That is how the West wins Phase 0. Not with bullshit.
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