The Ukrainian Doctrine of Distributed Pressure: From Spiderweb to Strategic Saturation

john raymond
Jul 26
3 min read

I have written extensively on the enemy plans and their strategic frame. In this article, I will instead explain the Ukrainian plan for victory.

I. The Strategic Pattern Behind the Headlines

Ukraine’s wartime planning has shifted decisively from seeking decisive blows on key infrastructure (Tier 1 targets) to systematically pressuring Russia’s petroleum and logistical infrastructure through sustained deep strikes on Tier 2 facilities—fuel depots, terminals, and regional refueling nodes.

This shift is not random. It is built on two foundational events:

II. Event One: Operation Spiderweb

The Proof of Deep-Strike Viability

Spiderweb, Ukraine’s drone attack targeting Russian strategic bombers deep inside Russian territory in 2024, demonstrated that deep-penetration operations were not only possible but sustainable—provided they were protected by strict operational security (OpSec).

Ukrainian drones struck air bases, damaging Tu-95 and Tu-22M bombers—long-range nuclear-capable aircraft—hundreds of kilometers inside Russia.

These operations stunned the Kremlin and Western observers alike not because of the scale, but because of the clarity of execution and secrecy.

Spiderweb proved the model: deep strikes succeed not through brute force, but through invisibility, patience, and precise coordination.

III. Event Two: The Purges of NABU and SAPO

The Expansion of OpSec Infrastructure

Following Spiderweb, Ukraine’s leadership took the controversial step of reforming and purging the country’s own top anti-corruption bodies: NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau) and SAPO (Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office).

This was not a move toward domestic authoritarianism. It was a wartime measure to control leaks, remove compromised or externally influenced actors, and consolidate OpSec across the Ukrainian state.

Foreign intelligence presence and internal surveillance from Western NGOs and unvetted individuals was creating operational vulnerability.

Zelenskyy’s government recognized that to scale up Spiderweb-style operations, it needed statewide discipline in secrecy, timing, and information control.

The move was as much about national survival as it was about pressing their deep-strike advantage.

This is how OpSec becomes doctrine: not a constraint, but a force multiplier.

IV. The Strategic Goal: Saturate the Middle Tier

The recent Sochi strike, and dozens like it, are not accidents. They are evidence of a doctrine in motion:

To defeat Russia, Ukraine will not destroy its most fortified centers, but collapse its connective tissue.

The focus is on:

Tier 2 fuel depots

Refueling nodes

Logistical staging points

Depot-level petroleum storage

These targets are:

Numerous (hundreds across Russia)

Softly defended

Militarily and economically essential

Impossible to protect en masse

This forms a classic asymmetric saturation problem:

The attacker needs only one success per strike. The defender must prevent every strike, everywhere, every time.

By expanding OpSec horizontally across operations, Ukraine can now attempt 5, 10, 20 such operations per week—each small in isolation, but together forming a strategic wave of disruption that Russia cannot easily absorb.

V. The Theory of Victory: OpSec-Enabled Attrition

Ukraine’s plan is not shock-and-awe. It is attritional collapse through distributed precision, enabled by:

Proof of capability (Spiderweb)

Institutional reform for secrecy (NABU/SAPO consolidation)

Mass production of medium-impact strikes (fuel depot saturation, etc.)

Psychological erosion (proving no place is safe, no matter how small)

Economic exhaustion (destroying petroleum logistics, depleting air defenses, and overloading civil response)

The logic is inverse to conventional warfare:

Instead of aiming for the crown, Ukraine aims for the spine.

Not to behead the Russian system, but to collapse it—joint by joint, node by node, depot by depot.

VI. Strategic Implication for the West

Understanding Ukraine’s doctrine has profound implications:

Western observers must stop evaluating strikes based on explosive yield or single-target value.

The latest Sochi attack is not small—it is part of a much larger strategic mechanism that, if sustained, will dismember Russia’s internal logistics over time.

What appears as “minor” is often the crucial node in a distributed network—and that’s where Ukraine is now striking most often.

VII. The Art of Drone War

The 2025 Ukrainian war plan is not centered on conquest—but constriction. Not on sweeping offensives—but unrelenting internal erosion. Its tools are small. Its method is secrecy. But its effect is cumulative collapse.

This is Ukrainian Doctrine: