Why Paul Warburg Is Right About Russian Fragility—Even Though He Downplays the “Alpha Event” Risk
- john raymond
- Jul 19
- 4 min read
Paul Warburg’s latest analysis is a valuable, detailed tour through the mechanics of Russia’s wartime economic endurance and its likely trajectory toward collapse. He is correct in identifying the exhaustion of Putin’s long-planned war chest, the inflationary and structural weaknesses in Russia’s economy, and the fundamental asymmetry at the heart of Putin’s regime security dilemma. On the trajectory Russia is currently following—siphoning reserves, bribing its way to military manpower, and deferring public unrest through cash—there is little question: collapse is increasingly likely.
But this is where a crucial distinction must be made. Likely does not mean certain. In fact, counting on collapse is itself a strategic mistake. Warburg’s framework is technically sound, but it lacks one thing: an understanding of how events, especially alpha events—low-probability, high-impact interventions—can disrupt even the most well-modeled trajectories.
The Alpha Event: Why the Future Isn’t a Trendline
Warburg’s model rests largely on the idea that Russia is operating on a declining curve of economic viability, and that no substantial outside factor has yet intervened to alter that curve. This is true. But the flaw is in assuming that just because it hasn’t happened, it won’t happen. That is the gambler’s fallacy in reverse.
Russia’s cannibalization of its own elite class is real and documented. Putin is squeezing oligarchs, jailing the insufficiently loyal, and expropriating assets to sustain the war effort. But this is not limitless. If the inner circle cracks—or simply cannot provide enough wealth fast enough—Putin will require an external infusion. That hasn’t happened yet. But the threat of it still looms.
The biggest unaccounted-for variable is outside help—specifically from China, India, or non-aligned powers seeking to tilt the board. Chinese material aid—while not evident yet—could arrive under the cover of deniable logistics. India, with its growing oil dependency and strategic balancing act, could shift from neutral buyer to covert facilitator. North Korea is already providing military manpower through contract troops. These alpha events are hard to predict but easy to imagine. They are within the realm of possibility, and any serious strategic doctrine must model for them.
P = E/t: Power, Energy, and Time
Using the framework of power as energy over time (P = E/t), we can think of both Ukraine and Russia as systems trying to project enough power to outlast the other. Ukraine is sustained by Western energy—capital, weapons, training, political will—distributed over time. Russia is burning stored energy (reserves) faster than it can replenish it.
But an alpha event—like a significant influx of Chinese credit or munitions—would alter Russia’s E in the equation. A sharp spike in energy (E), even over a short time (t), can create a flashpoint of temporary dominance. In a worst-case scenario, this could even lead to what we’d term a kinetic alpha victory in Ukraine—unlikely, but not unthinkable.
This is the point: trends are not guarantees. They’re tendencies, not outcomes. Strategic forecasting must include the possibility that war, like a chaotic system, can turn on a dime. A single decision in Beijing or Delhi could rewrite the entire balance sheet. And if our posture is built around counting on collapse, then our deterrence and response mechanisms may lag precisely when vigilance is needed most.
The Risk of Underestimating Russian Victory
Warburg dismisses the idea of Russian victory as highly implausible—and rightly so if one assumes no outside change. But war is never static. A war that is "not winnable" for Russia today may become more plausible if Ukraine’s aid dries up, NATO fractures, or domestic instability distracts Western governments. In short: we must not conflate unlikely with impossible.
This is a common trap of Western strategic optimism: measuring current capacity and projecting linear decline while ignoring nonlinear shocks. Russia’s path to collapse may seem locked in—but that sense of inevitability can become complacency. If Russian forces achieve a breakthrough, even a symbolic one like the seizure of Kharkiv or Odesa, the global diplomatic terrain could shift. Weak-willed NATO states could call for settlement. Sanctions enforcement could soften. Public opinion could sour. That, too, is an alpha event.
The Strategic Imperative: Never Count on Collapse
What does this mean for NATO and Ukraine’s supporters? It means prepare for collapse, but do not bet on it. Endurance is still the name of the game, but vigilance is its ally. Alpha events must be modeled, gamed, and mitigated against—not ignored because they’re not yet on the board.
Strategic doctrine must include resilience against trend disruption. This means hardening supply chains, locking in military aid over multi-year frameworks, and calling out asymmetric signaling when it appears—especially in China’s slow-drift posture toward providing more material support to Russia.
Warburg’s economic autopsy of Russia’s internal systems is accurate, detailed, and sobering. But a living enemy is not a corpse. A dying regime can still swing the sword. And until the last weapon is dropped, or the last oligarch is bled dry, we must operate as though the enemy can still win—because they can.
But Trend ≠ Destiny
Paul Warburg gives us a map of Russia’s decline. It is rigorous, insightful, and vital. But strategy demands we also study earthquakes, not just erosion.
Hoping for collapse is not a strategy. Preparation is.
The war is not over. The enemy has not collapsed. Hold the line. Assume the worst. Be ready for the alpha event.
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